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RECENT BOOKS
CONGRESS AND THE COURT. By Walter F. Murphy. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. xi, 308. $6.95.

Between March 18 and August 12 of 1958 the House of Representatives
of the United States Congress enthusiastically approved five bills which,
if enacted, would have been the most substantial restraint ever imposed
by Congress on the United States Supreme Court.1 There is no doubt
that dissatisfaction with the Court was at the time substantial in Congress
and widespread throughout the country. Yet by August 24 of the same
year the last of these bills had, in one way or another, been defeated.
Here is a prime legislative mystery which is now convincingly resolved
by Professor Walter F. Murphy in Congress and the Court. The author,
associate professor of politics at Princeton, explores in fascinating detail
the conflict between these two bodies that began in May 1954 and reached
its climax in August 1958. The book is also much more than that, for
this clash is merely the central, dramatic episode with which Professor
Murphy compares other attacks upon the Court and thus illumines the
continuing tensions that occasionally erupt into open conflict between
Congress and the Court. Even where his review of earlier disputes recounts familiar events, such as the Judiciary Act of 1802, the Chase
impeachment trial of 1804, -the Mccardle episode of the Reconstruction
period, and the Court-packing plan of 1936-37, it is important to be
thus reminded .that the crisis of the 1950's was not unique. Professor
Murphy makes that history lively, and he often provides insights into
those earlier periods that can be helpfully transferred t.o the present.
It is useful to be reminded, for example, that words of condemnation
scarcely exist in :the English language, from the sometimes elegant phrases
of scl1olarly distaste, to the most scurrilous insults, that were not long ago
used with reference to the Cour.t. Equally, it is interesting to learn how
limited is human inventiveness in the political process.
"By the close of Marshall's chief justiceship, almost all of the basic
measures to curb the Court had been seriously suggested or actually
tried: impeachment, reduction of jurisdiction, congressional review
of decisions, limited tenure, requirement for an extraordinary majority
to invalidate a statute, Court-packing, presidential refusal to enforce
a decision, and (at the state level) nullification and even resort to
force." (p. 63)
1 H.R. 3, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (to preclude federal pre-emption except where
Congress expressed specific intent to supersede state law); S. 1411, 85th Cong., 2d Scss.
(1958), as substantially amended in the House [to reverse the decision in Cole v. Young,
351 U.S. 536 (1956)); H.R. 8361, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (to restrict access of state
prisoners to habeas corpus in federal court); H.R. 11477, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958)
[to restrict the ruling in Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)); and H.R. 13272,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [to broaden the Smith Act definition of "organize," thus
reversing in part Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)).
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In the light of that experience and the strong anti-Court passions often
exhibited during these early years (including strikingly severe presidential
criticism) , it is encouraging to be told that "no anti-Cour,t legislation
passed Congress between the judiciary acts of 1802 and the Civil War.
Furthermore, the Court's prestige grew and flourished in the environment
of conflict, and that prestige remained at a high level until 1857." (p. 63)
Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to say that the only other occasion on
which Congress has ever succeeded absolutely in curbing the Court was in
the 1868 legislation restricting the jurisdiction of the Court to review
certain writs of habeas corpus, which was sustained in Ex parte McGardle. 2
At the same time it is true that the attack mounted in ,the midfifties was in some ways more substantial than anything that had gone
before. Unlike ,the proposals of President Roosevelt in 1936, in which many
saw nothing but a cynical attempt to pack the Court in order to save
an already floundering political program, the complaints of the 1950's
came from a variety of sources which in combination seemed at times
to include every respectable element of society. The coalition of forces
may have been peculiarly unstable because of the various, and sometimes
contrary, motivation of its supporters; but strong it seemed for a time to be.
In the years immediately before 1954 the critics of the Court, then
chiefly liberals, had proved largely impotent to effect change to their
liking. However, the former critics and supporters reversed positions
shortly after Earl Warren became Chief Justice in the Fall of 1953,
specifically wi,th the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.3 Segregationists were soon joined in condemnation of the Court by other
states' righters who were not primarily segregation-minded, by those who
reacted in the name of national security, and by those who feared a
breakdown in law enforcement at all levels. By August of 1958 a number
of state legislatures had voted defiant (and futile) resolutions of interposition; the association of state attorneys general had expressed alarm;
the state chief justices had called for "self-restraint"; an American Bar
Association committee had specifically disapproved some twenty-four
decisions of the Court; and some scholars were beginning to complain
about "unreasoned" decisions even when they reached a "right" result. If
crisis of confidence there ever was, this was it. Yet, surprisingly, the rising
2 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). For this purpose I do not count the four constitutional
amendments which were adopted, not so much to overturn Court decisions as to alter
provisions of the Constitution found defective. This is true of the eleventh, fourteenth,
sixteenth, and nineteenth amendments. Similarly, I would agree with Professor Murphy
(p. 262 n.) that it is not appropriate for this purpose to include such legislation as
that requiring three-judge courts to enjoin enforcement of certain legislative or administrative acts. As he points out (p. 262 n.) the Norris-LaGuardia Act could be classed
as an attack on the Court, but involved other issues as well.
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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crescendo of criticism never came to anything very much. True, the socalled Jencks bill had been enacted in 1957 in reaction to Jencks v. United
States; 4 but the statute has been described with considerable justification
as simply a codification, although somewhat modified, of the Court's
ruling; and most supporters of the bill disclaimed any intent to rebuke the
Court.5 The important thing is that none of the proposals designed to
restrict the Court's jurisdiction or its freedom of decision was finally
enacted. The reasons for this failure were at the time by no means clear.
Professor Murphy has remarkably illuminated the events of that period
to demonstrate what factors were most important in the defeat of the
anti-Court proposals.
It is an amazing story, made especially authoritative by the fact that
Professor Murphy relied not only on the legislative record, but as well
did extensive interviewing and on-the-spot research. The author shows,
for example, that the anti-Court leadership at one time had sufficient
strength to pass S. 654 (designed to reverse the pre-emption point in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson) ,6 but overreached themselves in seeking enactment
instead of H.R. 3 (denying all pre-emption except with specific congressional approval). (pp. 217-18) Some legislation actually passed the
Senate as well as ·the House, but the conference reports failed to receive
the necessary majority votes thereafter in both Houses. (pp. 218-23)
The study is valuable also for the picture provided of the role of
special-interest groups and of individuals. Among the individuals, Lyndon
Johnson, then Majority Leader of the Senate, was unquestionably the most
important. Murphy describes him thus:
"In a sense, Lyndon Johnson's role in the battle over the Warren
Court was unique. Johnson fully understood the ethic of the Senate.
He knew how to advise without becoming patronizing; how to
warn without seeming boorish; how to bargain without appearing
to bribe or promising more than he could deliver; how to appeal to
personal honor, party unity, Senate loyalty, or national welfare
without becoming unctuous. Moreover, Johnson knew where each of
353 U.S. 657 (1957).
In 1959, after the high point of the crisis, Congress filled in the jurisdictional "no•
man's-land" found by the Court in Guss v. Utah, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). NLRA § 14(c), added
by 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (c) (Supp. III, 1962). In the same year Congress
modified state power to tax the net income of interstate businesses approved by the
Court in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
Act of Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stat. 555. But these issues were scarcely the ones that had
agitated Congress in the critical years.
On June 19, 1962, President Kennedy signed P.L. 87-486, amending § 2385 of title 18
of the United States Code to define the word "organize" in the Smith Act "to include
the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of
persons." H.R. 3247, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1962). The effect of this is to reverse in part
the decision in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
6 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
4
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his colleagues in both parties stood--or wavered-and what each
wanted or feared. At the same time, he cleverly camouflaged his
own position; few people knew what Johnson really wanted, other
than to come out on the winning side. Perhaps most important, his
tactical genius and marvelous ability to dissemble were geared to
a restless energy and a burning personal ambition. There were many
factors which played a part in the defeat of the anti-Court bills;
but without Johnson's leadership, even though it was only warily
accepted by ,the more ardent of •the Court defenders, more legislation
would certainly have been passed and much of it signed into law."
(p. 249)
Professor Murphy convincingly demonstrates t,hat the anti-Court
faction in Congress was not able, a£ter 1958, to mount another full-scale
legislative attack against the Court in succeeding sessions of Congress.
Despite the impetus that might have been provided by the sharply critical
report of the Conference of Chief Justices in August 1958, and the more
temperate, but still critical, recommendations from the American Bar
Association in February 1959, the momentum of the attack was gone, aided
no doubt by the fact that several leading senatorial critics of the Cou11t
did not return to Congress in 1959.
Professor Murphy suggests ·that these leadership losses, in combination
with the 1958 election results which were generally viewed as favorable to
the liberal viewpoint, were enough to preclude the possibility of any substantial attack on the Court, at least in 1959 or 1960. With ·that I agree;
but he goes further to assert, somewhat gratuitously in my judgment, that
the Court blunted the aHack by a retreat from the criticized decisions.
I recognize that his view is widely accepted as orthodox, but I wonder if
the evidence justifies that rather serious reflection on judicial integrity.
He relies for this conclusion on several decisions of the 1958 Term in
which he finds withdrawal from earlier positions, and he suggests that
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan "were primarily responsible for the
Warren Court's shift in direction." (p. 265) If I may say, that is an
unlikely pair to find responding to congressional criticism. Even as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter has himself sought to clear Mr. Justice Roberts of
the charge that he was in 1937 a party to the alleged "switch in .time to
save nine," 7 I would strongly urge that ,the votes of Frankfurter in 1958-59,
as always, represented his own convictions, unaffected by fear of congressional retribution. Generalizing further, as I ,think one may, it seems
unlikely that any member of the Court during those years was amenable
to such influence. We need scarcely be reminded that these are strongminded men whose judicially expressed views are but the outward
manifestation of deeply held convictions.
In more specific answer, however, fur.ther notice should be given the
7 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 311 (1955).
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1958 Term. Professor Murphy makes much (as do other commentators)
of the Court's "withdrawal" from Watkins and Sweezy 8 in Barenblatt
and Uphaus. 9 While it is true that contempt citations for refusal to
answer questions posed by legislative bodies were set aside in the earlier
cases and upheld in the latter, it should also be noted that the cases were
distinguishable on their facts. Indeed, Mr. Justice Harlan in Barenblatt
specifically reaffirmed the principle of Watkins and Sweezy; and when
a comparable fact situation again came before the Court, in Deutsch v.
United States, 10 the Court applied the Watkins principle to upset the
conviction. Moreover, during the 1958 Term itself the Court unanimously
upset contempt convictions arising out of other congressional11 and state
legislative12 investigations. Scarcely the work of an intimidated Court that
knows well the art of avoiding decision where the decision is likely to be
unpalatable.
Nor can much be made of other "retreats" in the 1958 Term. It was
after all the year of Cooper v. Aaron,13 perhaps the most ringing of all the
Court's denunciations of segregation. It was also the year of Greene v.
McElroy 14 which occasioned the recasting of the entire government
employee security program when the Court denied that Congress had
authorized security discharges without confrontation. It was also the
year of Irvin v. Dowd,15 controversial in the extreme on the sensitive
points of habeas corpus and the right of state courts to make decisions
in criminal cases on grounds immune from federal court review. 16 Not
a bad record of liberalism for a Court described as in "retreat" from
conservative attacks.
Robert B. McKay,
Professor of Law,
New York University
s Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234 (1957).
9 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72 (1959).
10 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
11 Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147 (1958).
12 Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959). See also Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
13 358 U.S. l (1958).
14 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
15 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
16 See also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of New York, 360 U.S. 684
(1959) (denial of license for showing of "Lady Chatterley's Lover" invalid on stated
grounds); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (continuous questioning without
opportunity to consult counsel violates due process); NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240
(1959) (contempt citation of NAACP for failure to produce documents upset for second
time); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959) (absence of counsel denial of due process in
circumstances).

